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Abstract
Democratic politics builds on both clear differences and shared common ground. While
the rise of digital media may have enabled more differences to be articulated, common
ground is often seen as threatened by fragmentation of political debate, which some see
as driven by news media. The relative importance of political actors (parties and poli-
ticians) in driving fragmentation has received less attention. In this paper, we compare
how news media and political actors contribute to the fragmentation of online political
debate on the basis of analysis of almost half a million election-related tweets collected
during the 2017 French, German, and U.K. national elections. We employ a structural
topic model to reduce online political debate to networks of topic overlap. Across the
three countries with different political and media systems, we find news media are by
far the most important actors in terms of creating and maintaining a common space of
online political debate on Twitter. Our results also show that political actors, with
some variation from country to country, contribute more to fragmentation as they
focus on different topics while articulating clear differences. These findings underline
the importance of complementing structural analysis of the rise of digital and social
media with analysis of how important elite actors like news media and political par-
ties/candidates use these media in different ways. Overall, we show how at least on
Twitter, across three different countries with different media systems and political
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systems, news media create connection that contributes to commonality while political
actors lay out clear differences that drive fragmentation.
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Introduction
Democratic politics builds on both clear differences and shared common ground.
Deliberative democrats have often stressed the importance of consensus, commonality,
and shared institutions, even as others have underlined that political debate also requires
what Mill (2002) called “the rough process of a struggle among combatants fighting
under hostile banners.” In high-income democracies, different institutions have to
various degrees contributed to both sides of this. Katz (1996) has highlighted how
twentieth-century mass media often played an integrative role, as an institution that
“gathers together” the public by providing a form of shared common ground, while
Rosenblum (2008) argues political actors have played a similarly important, indeed con-
stitutive, role in democratic politics by drawing up “politically relevant lines of division”
that create clear differences and provide citizens with choices on the big important issues
of the day, thus “staging the battle” and animating political debate.
The rise of digital media may have enabled more differences to be articulated and
common ground is often seen as threatened by fragmentation of political debate
(Mutz and Young 2011). Some see these changes as driven by how news media
operate and compete for attention, sometimes in part by trying to attract partisan
audiences in a more competitive situation (Katz 1996). The continual move from
a relatively low-choice to a much more high-choice media environment exacerbates
these concerns (Carpini and Keeter 1997), as does the growing role of social media
(Newman et al. 2020). In an increasingly digital, mobile, and platform-dominated
media environment, researchers have found that news media cannot always provide
the “core” they offered in the past (Moeller et al. 2016). As a result, some suggest
that the so-called “social glue” (Sunstein 2001) is disintegrating and democratic soci-
eties risk fragmenting to a degree where they lose the ability to build consensus on
the basis of shared political debate.
The relative importance of political actors (parties and politicians) in driving frag-
mentation of political debate, however, has received less attention than the role of news
media. This is despite of there have been a growing number of calls for more compar-
ative and systematic investigation on how different kinds of actors shape online polit-
ical debate (Jungherr et al. 2019). In this paper, we respond to that call and analyze the
relative importance of, respectively, news media and political actors in contributing to
the fragmentation of political debate. As we will see below, the term fragmentation has
been deployed in the literature in many ways, but in this study, we use fragmentation to
refer to the extent to which news media and politicians lead people’s attention to the
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same set of issues. The basis of our analysis is election-related tweets collected during
the 2017 French, German, and U.K. national elections. We employ a recently devel-
oped variety of probabilistic topic models—referred to as a structural topic model or
STM (Roberts et al. 2014; Roberts et al. 2016)—to reduce almost half a million
tweets to networks of topic overlap. These networks map the topic space in each
country, that is, the structure of online political debate involving news media,
parties, and politicians, and help us understand their relationship through the topics
they touched upon. Then, we look at which topics are emphasized by political
actors with different ideological leanings (i.e., leftists versus rightists) and by different
media types (i.e., tabloids, digital-born, legacy, and public service). We follow by
employing a percolation process to assess the level of fragmentation of said networks
for each country. Finally, we examine the role that media outlets, politicians, and polit-
ical parties played in fragmenting the electoral debate through a series of simulations,
where we measure the fragmentation of the networks when any of them are excluded.
Across the three countries with different political and media systems, we find news
media are the most important actors in terms of creating and maintaining a common
space of online political debate, and that political actors, with some variation from
country to country, contribute more to fragmentation. These substantially important
findings suggest that debates over the fragmentation of the online political domain
often misunderstand the actual role of news media, in large part because they ignore
the role played by political actors. News media clearly no longer perform the twentieth-
century role imagined by Katz in a very different twenty-first-century media environ-
ment. Where political actors lay out clear differences that drive fragmentation, news
media create connections that help maintain some element of commonality. Our find-
ings thus underline the importance of complementing the structural analysis of the rise
of digital and social media with analysis of how important elite actors like news outlets
and political parties/candidates use these media in different ways, an empirical contri-
bution illustrating the important theoretical point made by Jungherr et al. (2019).
Methodologically, our contribution is demonstrating how STM can add to the anal-
ysis of political fragmentation in the online domain. STM has been increasingly used
within the field of political communication (Nicholls and Culpepper 2020; Puschmann
et al. 2020). We show how STM can be applied, in combination with tools borrowed
from network science, to investigate topic overlaps between media outlets and political
actors and thereby assess the levels of political fragmentation in the online domain.
Our research design allows us to draw conclusions about both the generalizability
and context dependency of our findings. We investigate the same type of event in dif-
ferent settings. By focusing on highly contested elections in a retrospective manner, we
take advantage of the ideological variance between political actors and media outlets
and relate observed differences to the electoral and national contexts in which they
emerged and provide a comparative perspective that is absent in most studies on polit-
ical and media fragmentation (among the exception being [Bright 2018; Fletcher and
Nielsen 2017; Majo-Vazquez et al. 2018]).
In the remainder of the paper, we proceed as follows. We first review the litera-
ture on political fragmentation and highlight how this concept’s operationalization
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and measurement still remain elusive. Then, we describe our data and methods and
finally, present the main results of our analyses. We conclude by discussing the
importance of our findings for an increasingly digital, mobile, and platform-dominated
media environment.
Literature Review
While democratic politics builds on both clear differences and shared common
ground, recent developments have led to considerable scholar focus on how differ-
ences can grow to a state where they undermine common ground and lead to a level
of fragmentation that can have negative effects on citizens’ involvement in political
debate and societies’ ability to maintain a sense of shared public concerns (Katz
1996). Fragmentation is in part related to limited exposure to diverse perspectives,
something that can have negative effects on forming opinions and appreciating other per-
spectives (Mutz andMartin 2001). Hence, fragmentation is often seen as a threat to social
cohesion and something that amplifies political polarization (Castro-Herrero et al. 2018;
Chaffee and Metzger 2001; Nir 2012).
Concerns over fragmentation have been further fueled by the rise of digital media and
social media, where political debate is often far more antagonistic and divided than the
subset of political debate mediated by mass media like television used to be. While there
is a growing body of work on online political fragmentation, however, there is still no
consensus on definitions, operationalizations, and measurements, and thus no consensus
on the scale and scope of online fragmentation.
The empirical work looking at the role of mass media in driving political fragmen-
tation is relevant for our purposes here. This strand of research has highlighted the
importance of media’s ability to transfer the salience of small preselected current
issues to the public agenda. By setting the public agenda and therefore, by influencing
the policy issues that citizens care about (McCombs and Shaw 1972), media shape their
priorities and facilitate a common space for public debate. However, the “end of mass
communication” (Chaffee and Metzger 2001) has questioned the gatekeeping role of
the news media and ultimately, their agenda-setting function and the rise of new gate-
keepers, including widely used platforms such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter (Nielsen
2016; Singer 2014). This has led to equate the multiplication of media sources to the
increase in political fragmentation. Despite the evidence being still contentious in this
regard (Cardenal et al. 2019; Gilardi et al. 2020; Langer and Gruber 2021;
Valenzuela et al. 2017), there is agreement on that in the current “hybrid media system”
(Chadwick 2013), how topics get at the center of public attention and hence, who has
the power to amplify them has to be revisited.
Some other relevant approaches to the study of fragmentation include research
looking at the extent to which different types of outlets set the media agenda (Lee
2007; McCombs 2005); studies of how audiences navigate the online news domain
as compared to the offline domain or across platforms and devices (Majo-Vazquez
et al. 2018; Webster and Ksiazek 2012; Yang et al. 2020); work on how frequently cit-
izens with different ideological leanings exchange information on political events in
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social platforms (Barberá et al. 2015; Rivero 2019); and on the degree to which news
use via social media leads people’s attention and concerns to policy issues channeled
by mainstream media (Feezell 2018; McCombs and Zhu 1995; Moeller et al. 2016).
Yet, because the evidence yielded by these studies is mixed and more importantly,
they do not look at the comparative role of news media relative to political actors,
it is difficult to form expectations about the so-called “discursive power” of these
actors in the online domain and compare their ability to lay the ground for public dis-
cussion (Jungherr et al. 2019).
With a few notable exceptions mentioned above, most of these studies looking at
political fragmentation from different angles do not offer cross-country evidence
either, which further complicates generalizations about how fragmentation is developing
in different contexts, many of whom are seeing broadly similar moves toward a more
digital, mobile, and platform-dominated media environment (Newman et al. 2020) but
differ in other important ways, including their media systems (Hallin and Mancini
2004) and political systems (Lijphart 1968).
Precisely because of the lack of previous research, there has been a call to system-
atically study the relationships and interdependencies among those who contribute
to “introduce, amplify, and maintain topics,” in the current political communication
space (Jungherr et al. 2019: 411). As Jungherr et al. (2019) argue, the extent to
which news media organizations, and also parties and political elites are able to
introduce topics in the public agenda is an indicator of their discursive power
and ability to shape political discourse that ultimately determine citizens’ political
preferences and vote decisions. These arguments, just like the work of Chadwick
(2013), warn against the tendency to analyze different actors in relative isolation,
but empirical analyses still often focus on either news media or political actors,
and rarely on both.
Political actors have flocked to social media platforms, where they in some ways
compete directly with news media for users’ time and attention. Parties and candidates
across the ideological spectrum use social media platforms to distribute campaign mes-
sages and calls to actions among other various activities (Jungherr 2016). They have
embraced social media in a manner that has led some to argue that news media’s
power over politics is broken (Margetts 2017) because the former can circumvent
media editorial gatekeepers by relying on platforms (where they in turn encounter
both algorithmic and user-driven forms of gatekeeping).
Undoubtably, social media platforms have changed the field for political informa-
tion distribution between media and political actors. To the same extent that established
media are losing their importance, the traditional way in which political debates were
conducted in Western democracies is also being challenged. Traditionally, the mass
media have been ascribed the function of providing shared knowledge on the basis
of common topics, which served—at least in theory—citizens as a basis for mutual
discussion and understanding as well as for a shared conception of social reality
(Vlasic 2004). As political actors gain discursive power through the rise of the plat-
forms (Nielsen and Vaccari 2013), they are able to base their approach to topics even
more strongly on election success and use agenda setting, priming, and framing
Heiberger et al. 5
purely strategically, also by means of de-thematization, counter-framing, and attack-
ing opponents (Strömbäck and Esser 2017).
How media and political actors deal with topics today reveals a lot about the state of
political debates in Western democracies. Yet, based on the reviewed literature, we
cannot have clear expectations on how they do that; therefore, we explore this using
the following research question (RQ).
RQ: How do media, politicians, and political parties contribute to the fragmentation
of the electoral debate on social media?
Data and Methods
To address our research question, we traced the topic space that emerged among news
media and political actors in the national elections in France, the United Kingdom, and
Germany in 2017 by using Twitter data collected between April 2, 2017 and May 8,
2017 in France, August 21, 2017 and September 25, 2017 in Germany, and May 5,
2017 to June 9, 2017 in the United Kingdom. We used the Twitter Streaming
Application Programming Interface (API) to collect all tweets sent by news media
and political actors that touched on the country elections. The final samples are
Germany N= 83,261, the United Kingdom N= 257,718, and France N= 154,362.1
As previous research has argued, Twitter data provide two main advantages to address
the questions at hand (Barberá et al. 2019). First, we use the same source of data to
measure the level of fragmentation in media and political discourses and the relationship
among them and second, the high granularity of the data, hardly found on other types of
text content, for example, news pieces or congress interventions, allows us to account for
the high volatility of political debate during election campaigns.
We defined our sample of news media outlets based on their overall audience
reach according to the Comscore audience meter. We obtained the ranking of the
most visited news sites with at least a percentage reach of 0.03 percent averaged
over the last 3 months before the elections in each country. This threshold allowed
us to included not only large legacy media outlets but also local ones.2 We strategi-
cally added recently founded news sites that were not indexed in Comscore yet. This
is the case of Brut (France) or popular news sites that fall at the extremes of the ideo-
logical spectrum (Égalité and Récontiliation or Fdesouche). In total, we studied
ninety-eight outlets and eleven presidential candidates and their parties in France;
160 and nine in Germany; and 129 and thirteen, respectively, in the United Kingdom.
For each country, only the leading candidates of each party, who concurred to the
elections are included in the analysis.
To reduce the corpus space of the election conversations in each country to a set of
relevant topics, we apply STM (Roberts et al. 2014, 2016).3 Topics are directly derived
from tweets by probabilistic algorithms and rely on the notion that words co-occurring
in and across tweets describe meaningful themes (or topics). The more often words
co-occur in documents (i.e., tweets), the higher the probability that they constitute a
topic. All words are thereby assigned to all topics in each country election, but depen-
dent on their context with different association strength.
6 The International Journal of Press/Politics 0(0)
Although still limited, the application of STM in political communication studies
has recently seen an increasing popularity. For instance, Nicholls and Culpepper
(2020) show how STM performs to identify frames based upon the content of articles.
Also, Puschmann et al. (2020) use STM to study the evolving agendas of right-wing
movements and parties on Facebook.
Compared to standard topic models (Jordan and Mitchell 2015), STM allows
improving the estimation of topics by using document metadata as covariates4.
STM does not assume that the distribution of words is the same for all documents,
but words in documents with the same covariates (e.g., year, source, etc.) have a
higher likelihood to be clustered together and used to form a topic. It has been
shown that the inclusion of covariates improves the quality of topic selection substan-
tially (Roberts et al. 2014, 2016), and including the date of documents in a topic, esti-
mations are especially useful for time periods and changing discourses (Farrell and
Drezner 2008). In our model, we use the day of each tweet as a covariate to
account for the volatility of the tweeting activity of each actor during the campaign.
The day of each tweet has been used in previous research to discriminate issue fre-
quencies in tweets during electoral campaigns (Conway et al. 2015).
The improvements of STM notwithstanding, it remains a central task for research-
ers to decide whether the derived topics are meaningful or whether one is “reading tea
leaves” (Chang et al. 2009). After carefully selecting quantitative metrics and qual-
itative judgment our choice for the number of topics is seventy for the United
Kingdom and France, and ninety for Germany. We elaborate in detail on those
choices in Appendix I.
Once the topics are inferred, we construct topic overlap networks between actors
(Shugars 2019; Yang and González-Bailón 2017). To build them, we calculate for
each actor its use of topics or topic load, that is, on which topic they score high or
low. This results in an N (number of actors) * M (number of topics) matrix, from
which we can derive a correlation matrix by actors. The resulting networks are com-
posed of nodes representing the actors and ties measuring the relationship among
them based on correlations of topic distributions. Thus, these networks measure the
extent to which media, parties, and politicians share the same topics of interest. The
more frequently they talk about similar topics, the more closely connected they are
in the network as measured by the strength of their ties.
We then assess the number of communities that exist in each network by running a
community analysis (Girvan and Newman 2002; Newman 2012), which is a techni-
que for the reduction of networks that classifies nodes into modules according to the
density of connections: nodes in the same module, that is, a subgroup have denser
connections among each other than with nodes in other modules. We can interpret
that media, parties, and politicians classified in the same subgroup converge on
topics they amplify for online debate. Finally, and more importantly, we use a frag-
mentation measure as defined by Borgatti (2006) to identify the most important
actors to ensure the information flowing in the network structure. In our case, this
analysis detects the type of actors having more common interests with most other
actors in the same network.
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Results
Topic Ownership
We first describe the topic ownership of different types of news media outlets
(digital-born, legacy media,5 tabloids, and public service broadcasters) and politi-
cal actors (parties and candidates). This analysis allows us to measure the extent
that the actors converged in tweeting about the same most popular topics. Then,
we proceed to test the fragmentation of the political debate in each country by
running a community analysis and applying a network percolation technique to
the networks of topic overlap. Finally, we assess the role of media outlets relative
to political actors, in fragmenting the political debate.
In our first analysis, that is, topic ownership, we look also at the differences across
the ideological spectrum. We measure topic ownership by calculating the relative fre-
quency of topic usage based on how often a topic has the highest loading per day by
actor. We find that most often one topic is dominating a day’s tweets of an actor. We
aggregate the results at the actor type level and show the most popular topics per actor
type in Figure 1.
To proxy the ideological leaning of news media outlets, we rely on data from the
Digital News Report (Newman et al. 2017) and average the self-reported left–right self-
placement of the audience of each outlet (7-point scale). Higher values of this variable
indicate a more right-wing outlet (for similar approaches see Gentzkow and Shapiro
2011). To infer the ideological position of political parties and candidates we use data
from the Manifesto Project Database (MPD) 20176 (Volkens et al. 2017), which provides
a left–right placement for parties based on the content analysis of the party programs.
Previous research comparing this classification approach to others based, for instance,
on expert assessments, shows the robustness of the categorization method (see, for
instance, Castro-Herrero et al. 2016)7. Using the MPD data, we classify all the parties
except for the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland. For this, we calculated the average
ideological leaning of its voters by relying on data from the European Social Survey
(ESS), 2016. Comparisons between measures built with the MDP and the ESS database
show strong and significant Spearman’s ρ coefficients (ρ= 0.826, N= 22).
Figure 1 shows the result of the topic ownership analysis for the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany. The y-axis depicts the importance of a topic for each type of
actor. To measure it, we calculate the percentage of tweets on a specific topic out of
all the tweets in a single day by actor. For example, looking at the United Kingdom,
we see that about 6 percent of all tweets by the left-wing parties on a single day
were, on average, dedicated to the main debate between the British candidates.
Figure 1 depicts only the topics with the top percentages (x-axis).
Across countries, results show that public discourse in France converged on a narrower
set of topics whereas, in Germany, there was a wider range of topics discussed. This may in
part reflect different political systems, one centralized and presidential, the other federal
and multiparty. Looking at differences within each country and focusing on the political
topics, we see that in the U.K. legacy media as well as political actors and media
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Figure 1. Topic ownership analysis by country. (continued)
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Figure 1. (continued)
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outlets on the right side of the ideological spectrum gave more importance to home
security issues. In France, political actors and media converge on most of the most
tweeted topics. Among the few exceptions is the coverage of the international
agenda, which received more attention by the left-wing parties in comparison to
the right-wing counterparts. Finally, results for Germany show there was less
agreement on the topmost salient topics during the campaign. Notably, right-wing
parties talked more frequently about key infrastructures and the nuclear threads by
the U.S. President.
Networks of Topic Overlap
To measure the extent to which actors converge on all topics discussed—beyond the
most popular ones, which we analyzed above—, we build a network of topic
overlap for each country. For this, we rely on distribution of topic use per individual
actor and correlate this distribution, that is, a vector of topic usage, to other actors’
topic distributions. If, for example, Media A is highly correlated to Party A, both
parties will have high loads on Topic 1, and low loads on Topic 2 and similarly
with any other pair of actors in the network.
Based on these correlations, we measure the relationship between individual news
media, parties, and politicians through the topics they simultaneously amplified. The net-
works shown in Figure 2 represent these relations. There, the ties measure the extent that
two actors are connected by a common interest in the same topics. The nodes in these
networks represent all media outlets, parties, and politicians. They are sized in proportion
to their betweenness centrality. In network theory, betweenness centrality measures the
extent that a node plays a role as a bridge among the other nodes in the network
(Newman 2010). Nodes with higher betweenness centrality lie on the shortest path
between other nodes and connect parts of the network that would be unconnected oth-
erwise. This means that the biggest nodes represent actors connecting other actors
from separate communities, which would remain otherwise unrelated. In our case,
these nodes operate as hubs fromwhere most of the electoral topics, discussed elsewhere,
are amplified for public discussion.
In the networks below, the color of the nodes represents actors belonging to the
same group amplifying similar topics for discussion.8 We have grouped the actors
by running a community analysis,9 which allows us to detect the extent that the
network is organized around subgroups and which actors are more closely connected
by converging on pushing similar topics in the public debate.
A visual inspection of the network maps shows a pattern that persists across the three
countries. The biggest nodes, those with higher betweenness centrality scores, represent
media outlets, mainly up-market newspapers, regional outlets, and tabloids, emphasizing
the central role of legacy media in front digital-born outlets, as previous research has
shown (Majó-Vázquez et al. 2020; Majo-Vazquez et al. 2018) (see the full ranking in
Table A1, Appendix III).10 This supports the visual intuition that while political actors
focus on very different topics, driving debate toward fragmentation, many news media
connect different topics across different communities, contributing to commonality.
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Figure 2. Networks of topic overlap of (a) the United Kingdom, (b) France, and (c) Germany.
Note: Round nodes represent media outlets, squared nodes represent politicians, and triangles
represent parties. To improve visualization, the networks have been constructed using the
planar maximally filtered graph (PMFG) approach (Tumminello et al. 2005). (continued)
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Fragmentation Analysis
Table 1 shows the results of the modularity analysis of the topic overlap networks.
This analysis returns a score ranging from 0 to 1; values closer to 1 indicate that
the modularity of the network is considered to be stronger (Newman and Girvan
2004), which is a proxy to measure the level of fragmentation of the structure into
subgroups. Our results consistently show that, independently of the community algo-
rithm used, France is the less fragmented topic space relative to the United Kingdom
and Germany. While this may reflect a more centralized and presidential politics in
France, in contrast to a multiparty political system and a more regional media system
in the United Kingdom and Germany, modularity scores are similar. To further test
the level of fragmentation of the networks, we apply a network percolation technique
(Borge-Holthoefer and Gonzalez-Bailon 2015). This method relies on the intuition
that networks with higher levels of fragmentation break up quicker when the most
central nodes are removed. We gradually remove the core nodes of each network
and measure their degree of fragmentation at each step. Thus, this approach does
Figure 2. (continued)
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not rest on subgroups (as the modularity approach does) but on the removal of sin-
gular nodes. We use different strategies to remove nodes, but they all follow the
same idea: ranking nodes according to different measures of centrality, that is,
degree, betweenness, and neighbor and remove the most central ones.
Figure 3 shows the results of the percolation process and confirms the most resil-
ient network corresponds to France. This is the network that kept showing lower
levels of fragmentation for a longer time when removing its most central nodes. In
our case, this result can be interpreted as a higher level of convergence among all
actors on the topics discussed during the elections and hence, a less fragmented polit-
ical debate that does not rely on a few bridging actors. On the opposite side, Germany
shows a lower resilience to the percolation process and therefore, higher levels of
fragmentation after the most central nodes are removed. This result signals the fragil-
ity of the network structure in Germany (at least at the national level) and that, in this
country, there is a lower level convergence on topics discussed. Again, this might
reflect a more regional political and media system. The United Kingdom with
mostly London-based, yet diverse media, and two main parties in England, lies
close to the German case as in the previous results.
Finally, to reveal the differences between the role of media, parties, and politicians
in fragmenting the networks, we first measure the fragmentation of the network if
media nodes are excluded. Then, we calculate the difference between those scores
and the fragmentation when parties and politicians are removed from the network.
Figure 4 shows the results with four instances of the same network at different
levels ties thresholded. For Germany and the United Kingdom, removing parties
and politicians from the networks, in almost all instances, results in a less fragmented
network than when news media outlets are removed. However, the case of France is
again different. In this country, differences only arise at the highest level of ties
thresholding. Then, political actors would fragment only slightly more the network
than media outlets. We have reproduced the same analyses with a higher and lower
number of nodes removed yielding similar results for all countries (see Figure A4
in Appendix II).
Table 1. Community Analysis Results.
Country Algorithm Louvain FastGreedy Eigenvector
Edge
Betweenness Walktrap
United Kingdom Modularity 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.53
Groups 8 8 13 7 13
France Modularity 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.56
Groups 6 6 8 8 7
Germany Modularity 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.54 0.53
Groups 6 6 9 8 8
Note. Values closer to 1 indicate that the fragmentation is stronger.
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Figure 3. Network percolation analysis: (a) degree centrality, (b) betweenness centrality, and
(c) neighbors centrality.
Note: The x-axis measures the percentage of nodes removed. The y-axis measures the level of
fragmentation as indicatedbyBorgatti’s (2006) fragmentation score. Thehigher the F-score, the higher
the network’s fragmentation. The graphs show the same analyses with four instances of the same
networkwith different levels of thresholds for ties.Degree centrality identifies themost central actors
as measured by the highest number of connections. The actors with higher betweenness centrality lie
onmost of the shortest paths between other actors. Neighbors select nodes with the highest degree,
that is, closest neighbors, connected to randomly selected nodes of the network (Chami et al. 2017).
For the latter, the average fragmentation of fifty simulations is used. (continued)
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Conclusion and Discussion
Across the three countries, we find the news media are the most important actors
to create a common public space for discussion on Twitter. Among them, legacy
media but also a few important broadcasters occupy relevant positions to bring
together the diverse topics in political debate generated in different parts of the
online domain.
There is still much to know about the relative importance of different actors in
driving the fragmentation of online political debate, but our study has advanced our
knowledge of these mechanisms by showing how, at least on Twitter, across three dif-
ferent countries with different media systems and political systems, news media create
a connection that contributes to commonality while political actors lay out clear differ-
ences that drive fragmentation.
We hope that further research will build on the approach we have developed and
deployed here by examining whether our findings hold up (a) across different national
contexts and (b) on different platforms. First, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom have different media systems and different political systems, and in that
sense, the overall similarities in our findings are important grounds for hypothesizing
that they might be generalizable to other settings, but clearly, media systems and polit-
ical systems elsewhere may mean that news media and political actors operate differ-
ently from those we have studied here. Second, our analysis while cross-nationally
comparative and including both news media and political actors is limited to
Twitter, an important platform for political debate, but structurally distinct and far
less widely used than larger competitors such as Facebook, just as it is a platform
with different affordances and a different user base than newer entrants like
Figure 3. (continued)
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SnapChat or TikTok. While it is possible that the dynamics we identify here recur
across different platforms, this is an empirical question. Different platforms are struc-
turally different in their affordances, algorithmic systems, and content moderation
practices, just as their user base often differs, and only empirical research can establish
whether the dynamics identified here are general across platforms or specific to
Twitter. Methodologically, we hope that such future studies of more countries and
more platforms will build on the approach developed here where we have provided
a way to measure online political fragmentation, which can be directly transferred
to other media and political contexts using also alternative sources of text data.
We also hope the substantial findings can inform thinking around the current state
and likely future direction of democratic politics. As noted from the outset, democracy
arguably builds on both differences and commonality, but in light of growing concern
Figure 4. Relative fragmentation analysis.
Note: The y-axis measures the difference in fragmentation values when parties and politicians are
removed from the network with respect to the values obtained when media outlets are removed.
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that fragmentation may be reaching dangerous levels, and the fact that some blame
news media for this, it is important to recognize the different role played by news
media versus political actors. As we have shown, independently of the thresholds
and selection strategy applied, at least on Twitter and in these three countries, news
media are the most important actors in terms of maintaining networks of topic
overlap and countering fragmentation.
Our study provides several starting points and building blocks for future theory
building. First, our findings suggest that the currently dominant media- and audience-
centered approach of fragmentation research should be rapidly complemented by a
political actor-centered approach. In many processes of political communication,
political actors have a causal function (Van Aelst et al. 2017: 3–4), and this function
must now also be more strongly recognized in fragmentation research. Second, the
growing importance of social platform media has not yet led to the elimination of
the integration function of traditional mass media, and this integration function
focused traditionally mainly on providing common topics. The mass media in the
countries studied here continue to contribute, with their topic choices, to the network-
ing of knowledge resources that can help members of the respective societies to reach
an understanding. Ultimately, according to Katz (1996), this role of the media counter-
acts the disintegration of the public sphere, since common topics can offer citizens ori-
entation as well as “common ground” for talking about politics with others. To what
extent these processes take place under the new communication conditions should
be explored in more detail and more countries in follow-up studies. Likewise, our
third finding, the higher level of topic fragmentation in Germany, deserves more atten-
tion. So far, findings from Germany indicate that it is precisely the traditional mass
media that ensure that the compatibility of topics is maintained and relationships
among users are enhanced (Geiss et al. 2018).
Finally, the normative evaluation of higher and lower thematic fragmentation is not
easy. One person’s worrying about “cyberbalkanization” can be another’s long
overdue cyber-independence, one person’s comfortably binding “social glue” can be
another’s unwelcome and stifling status quo. What we have tried to do here is not to
pass judgment on whether the online political debate is excessively fragmented, but
to understand the relative importance and different roles of news media and political
actors in shaping the online political debate we actually have, and our findings
suggest we should not blame news media for fragmentation.
Appendix I
Choosing the Number of Topics
Although STM solves other technical issues like finding the optimal starting parame-
ters and providing consistent results by a “spectral initialization” (Roberts et al. 2016),
selecting an appropriate number of topics (K ) is crucial for any further analysis.
Comparable to efforts in cluster analysis to determine the optimal number of clusters,
however, there is no “right” answer to the question of how many topics are appropriate
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Figure A1. Semantic coherence versus exclusivity: (a) the United Kingdom, (b) France, and
(c) Germany.
Note. Coherence of a semantic space addresses whether a topic is internally consistent. Topic exclusivity
measures the extent to which the topic words of a topic are distinct to it. K measures the choice of number
of topics.
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for a given corpus (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). As in other applications of topic
models (Munoz-Najar Galvez et al. 2020), the most important task is to select the
approximated number carefully and to show that the results are robust to that choice
(please see Appendix II). A choice of K can be misinterpreted as a substantive state-
ment about the composition of a corpus, which invites deserved criticism as there is
no way of obtaining a global optimum for this parameter. It is, however, possible to
approximate a most appropriate K by using established metrics.
Our choice for K= 70 for the United Kingdom and France, and K= 90 for Germany,
is based on two metrics: semantic coherence (Mimno et al. 2011) and exclusivity
(Roberts et al. 2014). The coherence of a semantic space addresses whether a topic
is internally consistent by calculating the frequency with which high probability
topic words tend to co-occur in documents. However, semantic coherence alone can
be misleading since high values can simply be obtained by very common words of a
topic that occur together in most documents. To account for the desired statistical dis-
crimination between topics we consider therefore also a topic’s exclusivity. This
measure provides us with the extent to which the topic words of a topic are distinct
to it. Both exclusivity and coherence complement each other and, hence, are examined
in concert to give us an impression where topics represent word distributions in doc-
uments and provide at the same time differentiated dimensions.
Figure A1 shows how the increase in number of topics (K) improves exclusivity scores
whereas decreases coherence in all three cases. The developers of STM recommend that
researchers look for the “semantic coherence-exclusivity frontier.” For each case, we can
observe such a “plateau” (for France K= 70, United Kingdom= 70, and Germany= 90).
Given the trade-off between more exclusive, yet less coherent (in the upper sense) topics,
those plateaus form the most parsimonious (i.e. smallest) choices of K. However, it is
important to note that the networks between agents which we derive from the STMs
are not changing and that they are robust whether we choose seventy or ninety topics.
There are several other tuning parameters in STMs that we have allowed to remain
in their default value or have modified exclusively to reduce the time of computation
without any effects on topics.
Appendix II
Robustness Checks
Our results need to hold across different setups; otherwise, we run into the danger of
interpreting artifacts. There are three crucial choices in our models: (i) the most general
is the number of topics (Appendix I); (ii) a more specific decision is how many nodes
we exclude for each type of actor when it comes to measuring relative fragmentation;
and (iii) finally, we needed to select thresholds for thematic similarity.
While we already provide different thresholds in Figure 3 and saw no change in
fragmentation patterns, we will (i) depict alternative choices for K and (ii) different
numbers of extracted nodes. More specifically, we set in Figure A2 K= 70, K= 80,
and K= 90 for all three countries to exclude the possibility that the larger fragmentation
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of the German discourse was due to a wider range of topics. We further explore differ-
ent K for Germany—since it was the outlier regarding K—and investigate whether
those choices affect the results of the fragmentation analysis by type of actor
(Figure A3). Finally, we check how different numbers of extracted nodes influence
our results on fragmentation by type of actor (Figure A4). All figures indicate that
our results are indeed robust to those methodological choices.
Figure A2. Network percolation analysis K= 70.
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Figure A2.1. Network percolation analysis K= 80 and K= 90.
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Notes
1. See Supplemental Information file for more information on the data gathering process and
filtering.
2. We only included domestic media outlets or foreign brands, which fully operated from the
studied country at the time of the elections, for example Huffington Post UK. See the full
lists of media outlets in the online Supplemental Information file.
3. We used R for all calculations and, in particular, the STM package (Roberts et al. 2020) for
topic modeling.
4. Another comparison might be drawn to semantic network analysis (Rule et al. 2015; Yang
and González-Bailón, 2017). While both approaches rely on word co-occurrences, topics
constitute latent dimensions that connect words in a bipartite network instead of unipartite
ties in semantic network analysis (Griffiths et al. 2007).
5. Upmarket newspapers, commercial television, and radio are included under the category
“legacy media.” Tabloids and public service media are also legacy media but here are ana-
lysed as separated categories to assess the differences in their roles.
6. For the Union Populaire Républicaine (France), Social Democratic and Labour Party and
Ulster Unionist Party (the United Kingdom), and Piraten (Germany), we used data from
the MPD 2012, 2015, and 2013, respectively.
7. To elaborate, we used the left–right continuum to proxy news outlets and politicians’ ide-
ology since it is one of the most broadly used dimensions to analyze ideological differences
on a general ideological outlook in Europe. Party competition in all countries considered in
this study is structured along this dimension. As previous researchers argued, this contin-
uum captures a wide variety of conflicts and cleavages across cultures (Inglehart and
Klingemann 1976). Cross-national surveys such as the European Election Study Survey
show indeed that citizens all throughout Europe consistently place social-democrat or con-
servative parties on opposite sides of the aforementioned continuum. Furthermore, their
party placements are correlated with party categorizations along this continuum from
further approaches using manifestos (see also Castro-Herrero et al. 2016).
8. See in Supplemental Information file, all nodes in each community and the network statis-
tics by country.
9. We use the Louvain algorithm (Blondel et al. 2008) to graph the networks below. In
Table 1, we compare the results of the modularity scores obtained across five different algo-
rithms for community analysis with very similar results.
10. In the case of the United Kingdom, at the brand level, the BBC, ITV news, and Sky News
are among the top most central nodes (see Figure A5 in Appendix III). The BBC operated
seven different Twitter accounts for news information, resulting in a less centralized news
distribution at the account level.
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